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Why are Some People More Hostile to Immigrants than Others?
Abstract
Immigration often come with hopes for a better life, mostly in terms of one’s economic situation. While it’s
intuitive to assume the economic opportunism hurts the local labor market and thus rightly triggers local
hostility, this essay argues otherwise. In a political sense, immigration is a conservative strategy, a
passive choice, because the person is not intended to subvert the existent social structure to better his
life. However, on a sociological level, immigration is actually avant-garde, in that life after immigration is
highly uncertain. Therefore it is adventurous, risk-taking, and in a sense, progressive and radical. On the
one hand, the progressive nature of immigration necessitates active and innovative approaches to carve
out their new life, which could challenge the existing social and political structure and order. On the other
hand, the passive nature of immigration determines that their avant-garde spirit could only go so far
before being accommodated within the institutional structure of destination, in which they then negotiate
their identity along with their social, economic, and political position with their local counterparts. It is this
re-negotiation process that could spawn hostility towards immigrants. With several empirical researches
providing counter- intuitive evidence, this essay argues that it is the perceived economic loss of local
labor from re-negotiation in the labor market, particularly during the economic downturn, which encourage
hostility towards immigrants. More importantly, on the political level, the re-negotiation of one’s identity
out of growing leverage on an economic and political level generates the xenophobic rhetoric of some
politicians, who channel hostile sentiment towards immigrants either because of perceived threats or
solely for an electoral advantage in a xenophobic community.
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perceived economic loss of local labor from re-ne-

life, mostly in terms of one’s economic situation.

gotiation in the labor market, particularly during

While it’s intuitive to assume the economic oppor-

the economic downturn, which encourage hostility

tunism hurts the local labor market and thus rightly

towards immigrants. More importantly, on the polit-

triggers local hostility, this essay argues otherwise.

ical level, the re-negotiation of one’s identity out of

In a political sense, immigration is a conservative

growing leverage on an economic and political level

strategy, a passive choice, because the person is

generates the xenophobic rhetoric of some politi-

not intended to subvert the existent social structure

cians, who channel hostile sentiment towards immi-

to better his life. However, on a sociological lev-

grants either because of perceived threats or solely

el, immigration is actually avant-garde, in that life

for an electoral advantage in a xenophobic commu-

after immigration is highly uncertain. Therefore it is

nity. Similarly, the re-negotiation of identity also

adventurous, risk-taking, and in a sense, progressive

emboldens the need of those who hate immigrants to

and radical. On the one hand, the progressive nature

create and strengthen their group identity against the

of immigration necessitates active and innovative

existence of immigrant “others.” Although all three

approaches to carve out their new life, which could

factors target only a certain group of immigrants,

challenge the existing social and political structure

they engender “collateral damage” by galvanizing

and order. On the other hand, the passive nature of

hatred sentiment towards other immigrant groups

immigration determines that their avant-garde spirit

(Perez, 2015). Correspondingly, the perceived

could only go so far before being accommodated

hostility by the immigrant group gives impetus to

within the institutional structure of destination, in

re-negotiation by raising awareness of their own

which they then negotiate their identity along with

group identity, enhancing political participation,

their social, economic, and political position with

and further obfuscating their assimilating into the

their local counterparts. It is this re-negotiation pro-

host society. Consequently, the enhancing effect of

cess that could spawn hostility towards immigrants.

re-negotiation in immigrant groups, together with a

With several empirical researches providing count-

defensive “self-othering” approach, further threatens

er-intuitive evidence, this essay argues that it is the

local residents and again feeds into a xenophobic
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narrative, which is then exploited by both politicians

cific “competing native workers”— 3-4% reduction

and other groups.

in wages from 10% increase in labor supply, for in-

First of all, the perceived economic security of

stance. (Borjas, 2003).

local labor has been changed by immigrants. The

In agreement with the economic negative impact

following alleged harmful impact of immigrants on

of the immigrant, Habyarimana et al. (2007) sought

the local labor market could explain some local hos-

to explore why increasing diversity, which comes

tility towards immigrants. The economic “textbook”

along with certain immigrant groups, would under-

competitive model simply suggests that an increasing

mine public goods. Their experiment demonstrates

supply of labor should lower the wage of competing

that higher levels of ethnic homogeneity brings more

factors, if not crowd out extant employment opportu-

successful public good provision because of a “strate-

nities. This indication seems to buttress the intuition

gy selection mechanism” that makes “co-ethnics play

that an increase of immigrants could hurt the econom-

cooperative equilibria, whereas non-co-ethnics do

ic benefit of local laborers. This hypothesis seems to

not.” In addition, a “technology mechanism” also bol-

be substantiated by Borjas (2003). He argues that it

sters better provision in this circumstance because the

is biased to only focus on the impact of immigrants

threat of sanctions against non-compliance is more

on a national level because the internal displacement

salient to co-ethnics who are “more closely linked

of local labor within the nation could conceal the real

on social networks” (Habyarimana et al., 2007). Al-

impact of immigrant influx. In addition, he shows

though the experiment was conducted in Uganda, its

that education should not be the only gauge to de-

implication holds valid that co-ethnics comply better

termine the substitutability between immigrants and

within group norms like reciprocity and coopera-

local workers. Immigrants with the same education

tion, plausibly because of the easier identifiability of

level but different experience would have imperfect

and hence sanctioning on co-ethnics (Habyarimana et

substitutability due to different working experience.

al., 2007). However, neither of these two proposals

However, they would be better substitutes and thus

withstand challenge upon the economic damage on

harm specific groups of local labors with both simi-

local workers.

lar education and experience. Therefore, the variance

Refuting the research method and result from

in distribution of immigrants with different levels

Borjas (2003), Ottaviano and Peri (2012) find that

of education and work experience would imbalance

variance in experience does not have a substantial im-

the labor supply and induce harm upon a more spe-

pact on the substitutability of immigrants and native
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workers with the same educational level. More im-

from other EU countries, Wadsworth et al. (2016)

portantly, apart from the traditional “partial wage ef-

concludes that while economically EU immigrants

fect” of immigrants that mainly focuses on the impact

contribute significantly more than they claim from

upon certain groups, they introduce the “total wage

social welfare and thus bolster the British econom-

effect” that emphasizes “complementarities among

ic recovery, the general economic circle, such as the

different types of immigrants and natives.” Together,

economic crisis in 2007, can facilitate the ostensible

they show that the influx of immigrant has a small

causation between an increase of immigrants and job

effect on average native wages (+0.6%) (Ottaviano &

loss or wage lowering.

Peri, 2012). Their finding is in line with the research

Moreover, if economic concern is really a salient

of Card, who finds that in 1990 Mariel immigrants

factor that generates hostility, then the old generation

increased the Miami labor force by 7% but appeared

of immigrants should hate the new immigrants more

to have virtually no effect on the wages or unemploy-

than local laborers because, indicated by Ottaviano

ment rates (Card, 1990).

and Peri’s research, that that because the older gen-

Notwithstanding their importance, these empir-

eration of immigrants suffer from a substantial nega-

ical researches do not eradicate the local workers’

tive effect (-6.7%) on wages after the new inflow of

hostile allegation on economic concerns towards im-

immigrants (Ottaviano & Peri, 2012). Such a hypoth-

migrants, indicating that it is most likely the belief of

esis has been countered by Bergh and Bjørklund’s

economic harm upon local labors that help sustain the

research on voting behavior of immigrants in Nor-

hostile sentiment. Along with the changing economic

way. Bergh and Bjørklund (2011) find that, despite

position in the labor market, the local laborers had

economic competition, immigrants groups as a whole

to re-negotiate their benefits with these “outsiders,”

still share a strong sense of group adherence. This

thus generating a grudge that is waiting to erupt at

collective identity, rather than by individual ideology

the “proper” time, such as in 1982, when “an unusu-

or social-economic background explains the stable

ally severe cyclical effect” caused “one of down turn-

electoral preference of immigrant groups towards the

ings on local wage” (Card, 1990). The research by

non-Western world for left-of-center parties. That the

Wadsworth et al. also further supports this proposal

older immigrants might get hurt economically by the

that perceived loss during the social re-negotiation

new-comers does not impede all immigrants from liv-

of economic benefit generates hostility towards im-

ing together and, in addition to their economic gains,

migrants. Focusing on Brexit’s impact of immigrants

claim political power.
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Furthermore, Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) test the

from “irregular immigrants” on “specific social or-

Group Threat theory and find that “Anglos residing in

ders and values, for instance about citizenship, na-

communities where the size of the out-group is large

tional identity and otherness.” Differing from hostile

are less likely to participate than individuals who re-

groups who mainly focus on economic or electoral

side in communities where the size of the out-group

aspects, Hate groups are ideological organizations

is small.” Although Leighley and Vedlitz’s finding

of individuals who “have beliefs or practices that at-

does not mean that the minority candidates could

tack

benefit significantly from their ethnicity, Anthony et

typically

al., find that the candidates from those constituencies

tend to follow extreme-right and white suprema-

with smaller immigrant population could indeed ben-

cist ideologies (Adamczyk et al., 2014; Mulholland,

efit more electorally when they specifically appeal

2013; Gemignani & Albujar, 2015). Validating the

to non-immigrant voters. This political exploitation

left-centrist electoral preference of immigrant groups

is particularly true when the minority candidates are

as mentioned above, hate groups embrace the dis-

Muslims, whom are much less favored by Anglo vot-

course of identity development through the ongoing

ers (Anthony et al., 2014). Therefore, given the rising

dialogue of “I am/I am not and you are/you are not”

number of immigrants under the economic strain, it is

(Gemignani & Albujar, 2015). On the one hand, they

particularly convenient, or even contingent, for some

develop their own identity as “heroes, saviors and

politicians to exploit the tension between immigra-

protectors of American values” who are “acting for

tion influx and discontent of locals. Brexit and the

the service of legality and justice,” on the other hand,

election of Donald Trump, to a certain extent, attest

they label those unauthorized immigrants as “invad-

to such explanation.

ers, aliens, drug dealers, parasites and prostitutes

or

malign
for

an

their

entire

class

of

people,

immutable characteristics...”

Besides the exploitative and instrumentalized

threatening the pre-established social order,” in this

politicization of hostile sentiment against immi-

way reducing one’s “humanity “his/her border cross-

grants, some people are genuinely averse to the

ing” (Gemignani & Albujar, 2015). Despite that the

immigrant groups in the process to re-negotiate their

members of hate groups ostensibly only target undoc-

social roles. Researchers on hate groups in the U.S.

umented immigrants, they actually “push the limits of

who are against undocumented immigrants, Gem-

mainstream discourse”, in a way to normalize view

ignani and Hernandez-Albujar (2015) demonstrate

and opinions of discrimination and violence that go

how these hate groups forge the narrative of threat

beyond the unauthorized group, those discourse that
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would otherwise be regarded as radical (Gemignani

mainstream government further consolidates their

& Albujar, 2015).

in-group identity, highlighting their sense of moral

Not only problematizing and even self-criminal-

obligation that they are the only saviors against

izing the unauthorized immigrant by this self-granted

the “invaders,” thus making them blame and hate im-

judicature position, the hate groups also demonstrate

migrants more.

their distrust and disappointment towards government

120

In response to hostility, the immigrant groups

in dealing with such problem. In response, the hate

are lambs to the slaughter. In fact, as mentioned at

groups proclaim “a supposed ability to address [the

the beginning of this essay, the progressive and

problem of undocumented immigrants]”, while in the

radical features of immigration have determined

meantime “develop specific positions of power for

that immigrants, who brave the uncertainty lying

themselves” (Gemignani & Albujar, 2015). Through

ahead of their migration, will adjust their habits to

the “narratives of reification (e.g. the creation of the

strive for a better life. Therefore when xenophobic

‘illegal’), opposition (us versus them), exclusion, su-

rhetoric prevails, such hostility against immigrants

periority (e.g. of the native citizen over the undoc-

actually raises the “salience of ethnic identity and

umented

impugns its worth” (Perez, 2015). In particular, the

immigrant), problematization, instillation

of fear, and depicting undocumented immigrants as

“strong political response” elicited by xenophobic

disposable, second-class members of society,” those

rhetoric in the minority group is to assert the worth

hate group members create their own subjectivi-

of a group they value (Perez, 2015). In accordance

ties, along with imposing their own narrative of

with findings such as that of Bergh, which showed

immigrants on others (Gemignani & Albujar, 2015).

the variance of group loyalty between the new com-

Rather than economically or politically motivated,

ers and those who have settled in their host country

these hate group members are “part of a larger and

in a while, Perez also demonstrates the importance

more pervasive discourse of neo-liberal discrim-

of acculturation of individuals whose “orientation

ination” that actively creates systematic cleavages

toward a host society might be described as im-

between “insiders and outsiders, winners and losers

plying distance from, or less contact with, the

(or, legals and illegals), and full citizens and sec-

mainstream public” (Perez, 2015). This self-other-

ond-class newcomers” (Gemignani & Albujar, 2015).

ing factor is particularly noteworthy in its influence

Together with their internalized hostility against

on the “the second generation: the American-born

immigrants, their collective disappointment with

offspring of immigrants who bridge the least and
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most acculturated elements of the Latino com-

tially induces mutual hostility.

munity” (Perez, 2015). Combining with the find-

Resonating with the strengthening effect in-

ings that the descendants of immigrants perform

group identity generated by deliberate xenophobia

better at school They are also more likely to attain

as mentioned above, this backlash also confirms that

a higher education. This finding suggests that those

“parental investment overcompensate for the direct

second generation immigrants would have better

effects of assimilation policies” (Fouka, 2016). This

economic prospects and higher political partici-

may explain Group Conflict theory which emphasiz-

pation rates. Xenophobia, whether it is economic,

es the historical relationship between two groups, that

political, or social, only leads to further alienation

ethnic diversity could indeed undermine the provision

between local residents in host societies and immi-

of the higher level of public goods. However, this ex-

grants, thus exacerbating the confrontational rela-

ample, as well as other ones mentioned in this essay,

tionship.

illustrate that the failure of the public goods provi-

Sometimes hostility comes not from negative

sion is attributed to these factors for their facilitat-

sentiment, but actually from a benevolent attempt

ing inter-group hostility and segregation, as claimed

to bridge the gap. As exemplified by the attempt of

by Habyarimana et al. (2007). In other words, it is

the U.S. government to force assimilation of German

the policy in response to ethnic diversity, rather than

immigrants during and after WWI. During 1917 and

ethnic diversity per se, that is the cause of failure of

1923, several U.S. states barred foreign language

public goods provision.

from their schools, particularly German, in hope to

Nonetheless, the perceived economic loss of lo-

lessen the cultural identity of German immigrants.

cal labors, the power re-negotiation out of a growing

Such policy “instigated a backlash”: those German

leverage on an economic and political level gener-

descendants who had been affected by the language

ates the xenophobic rhetoric of some politicians, and

law, particularly those children who had two Ger-

the identitarian re-negotiation of those hate group

man parents, were less likely to volunteer in WWII,

members explain why some people are more hostile

and more likely to marry within their ethnic group,

towards immigrants. The immigrant group gives

as well as to choose decidedly German names for

impetus to the re-negotiation by rising awareness of

their offspring (Fouka, 2016). Therefore, the genuine

their own group identity, enhancing political par-

attempt to assimilate immigrants could also lead to

ticipation, and further obfuscates their assimilation

inter-group segregation—self-othering, which poten-

into the host society. Consequently, the enhancing
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effect of re-negotiation in immigrant group, togeth-

(2015). “Hate groups targeting unauthorized

er with their defensive “self-othering” approach,

immigrants in the US: discourses, narratives

further threatens local residents and again feeds into

and subjectivation practices on their web-

a xenophobic narrative which is then exploited by

sites.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 38.15: n.

both politicians and other groups. In the meantime,

pag. Web. 8 May 2017.

the confrontational responses from immigrant group
only exacerbate the hostility.

Habyarimana, James et al. (2007). “Why Does Ethnic
Diversity Undermine Public Goods
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